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My purpose in this paper is to show that the two major options on which 
the current debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics relies, 
namely realism and empiricism (or instrumentalism), are far from being 
exhaustive. There is at least one more position available; a position which 
has been widely known in the history of philosophy during the past two 
centuries but which, in spite of some momentous exceptions1, has only 
attracted little interest until recently in relation to the foundational 
problems of quantum mechanics. According to this third position, one may 
provide a theory with much stronger justifications than mere a posteriori 
empirical adequacy, without invoking the slightest degree of isomorphism 
between this theory and the elusive things out there. Such an intermediate 
attitude, which is metaphysically as agnostic as empiricism, but which 
shares with realism a committment to considering the structure of theories 
as highly significant, has been named transcendentalism after Kant. 
Of course, I have no intention in this paper to rehearse the procedures 
and concepts developed by Kant himself; for these particular procedures 
and concepts were mostly adapted to the state of physics in his time, 
namely to Newtonian mechanics. I rather wish to formulate a generalized 
version of his method and show how this can yield a reasoning that one is 
entitled to call a transcendental deduction of quantum mechanics. This will 
be done in three steps. To begin with, I shall define carefully the word 
“transcendental”, and the procedure of “transcendental deduction”, in terms 
which will make clear how they can have a much broader field of 
application than Kant ever dared to imagine. Then, I shall show briefly that 
                                         
1See E. Cassirer, Determinism and indeterminism, Yale University Press, 1956 (text of 1936); G. 
Hermann, “Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik”, Abhandlungen der Fries’schen 
Schule, Sechster Band, 2. Heft. 1935. French translation and extensive comment in: Les fondements 
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field theory possible?, Oxford University Press, 1995; B. Falkenburg, Teilchenmetaphysik, Spektrum 
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the main structural features of quantum mechanics can indeed be 
transcendentally deduced in this modern sense. Finally, I shall discuss the 
significance, and also the limits, of these results.   
 
2-The functional a priori 
 
Kant's classical definition of the transcendental attitude, as contained in 
the introduction to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
develops thus: “I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is 
not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of 
objects, so far as this mode of knowledge is possible a priori ”2. Such a 
reversal of focus, from objects to our knowledge of objects, is typical of 
what Kant called the Copernican revolution.  
Both transcendent and transcendental considerations go beyond what is 
immediately given in appearances. But whereas manipulating transcendent 
entities means trying to account for the link between appearances by 
invoking something outside the boundaries of human knowledge, using a 
transcendental stragegy is tantamount to ascribing the unity of the 
manifold of appearances to something which definitely belongs to the 
human faculty of knowledge, namely to pure understanding. This shift 
enables one to stop wondering, or invoking pre-established harmony, when 
the remarkable agreement between the processes involving physical objects 
and our representations is at stake. Indeed, the greater part3 of this 
agreement arises automatically from the fact that, provided each object is 
construed as the focus of a dynamic synthesis of phenomena rather than as 
a thing-in-itself, its very possibility qua object depends on the connecting 
structures provided in advance by our understanding.  
Attractive as Kant's original strategy may appear, it has nevertheless 
some features which do not fit with current philosophical standards, and 
which will have to be modified if we want to proceed with the 
transcendental approach. Let us discuss two of these features, which are 
especially relevant to physics.  
Firstly, the element of passivity which enters in the way Kant said the 
objects are presented to us, is excessive. True, he insisted that in physics 
“Reason must approach nature with the view of receiving the information 
from it, not however in the character of a pupil who listens to all that his 
master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the 
witnesses to reply to those questions he himself thinks fit to propose”4. But 
this way of anticipating the answers of nature was restricted to the intuitive 
and intellectual form of knowledge. Regarding what he called the matter of 
knowledge, Kant relied on the empiricist and aristotelian tradition, and 
                                         
2I. Kant, Critique of pure reason, (new edition, by V. Politis), Everyman's library, 1993, B25, p. 43 
3Either completely in mathematics, or partly in physics. 
4I. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit. BXIII, p. 14 
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considered that it is passively received as sensations; that in other terms the 
objects are given to us by means of sensibility5. Even though Kant's use of 
the concept of thing-in-itself can be read as a way of expressing that, in our 
knowledge of objects, we cannot separate what is provided by our 
cognitive capacities from what affects us, he never extended his remark 
one step further, namely from the cognitive forms to the form of 
experimental activity. And he therefore did not recognize that experimental 
activity is able to shape appearances and not only to select it or order it; 
that in other terms experimental activity partakes of the constitutive role he 
ascribed to our cognitive capacities. The idea that phenomena cannot be 
separated from the irreversible operations of experimental apparatuses is to 
be ascribed to Bohr, not to Kant6.  
This is one reason why, if we want to apply the transcendental method to 
quantum mechanics, we must adopt a thoroughly modernized version of it, 
such as Hintikka's.  According to Hintikka, what is needed to make the 
transcendental method acceptable nowadays is a shift of emphasis from 
passive reception and purely mental shaping to effective research activities 
and instrumental shaping7. As he writes, “(...) the true basis of the logic of 
existence and universality lies in the human activities of seeking and 
finding”8. The definition he gives of the transcendental attitude is modified 
accordingly. The transcendental attitude no longer consists in reversing 
attention from the objects to our knowledge, but  rather from the objects to 
our games of seeking and finding. As a consequence, the objects are no 
longer regarded as constituents of our experience, but rather as (i) potential 
aims for our activities of research and resolution and (ii) elements in our 
strategy for anticipating the outcomes of our activities.  
The second point which does not fit with current philosophical standard 
concerns the latin expression a priori.  In Kant's definition of the term 
‘transcendental’, the use of this expression is misleading. It may sound as if 
the forms or the connecting structures which we present in anticipation  to 
the appearances are innate, or at least that they are uniquely determined 
“for all times and for all rational beings”9. Actually, Kant has never gone as 
far as asserting that the a priori forms of intuition and thought are innate. 
According to him, the forms of intuition and thought are not 
chronologically but only logically prior to experience. And the reason why 
they are logically prior to experience, the reason why they cannot be 
                                         
5I. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit. A19/B33, p. 48 
6
 In view of the Bohrian concept of a phenomenon as irreducibly relative to a given experimental 
context, Grete Hermann pointed out that, far from falsifying transcendental philosophy, quantum physics 
may be an incentive to radicalizing it. See L. Soler’ introduction, in G. Hermann, Les fondements 
philosophiques de la mécanique quantique, op. cit. p. 45 
7
 This idea also fits with recent developments in the cognitive science, such as F. Varela’s concept of 
enaction. F. Varela, E. Thompson, & E. Rosch, The embodied mind, MIT Press, 1993. 
8J. Hintikka & I. Kulas, The game of language, Reidel, 1983, p. 33 
9S. Körner, Introduction to E. Cassirer, Kant's life and thought, Yale University Press, 1981, p. XI 
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extracted from experience, is that experience is only possible under the 
condition that it has been shaped by them10. It is true however that Kant has 
maintained an uniqueness and invariability claim about his forms of 
intuition and thought. Now, it is precisely this invariability claim which 
makes Kant's version of transcendental philosophy so vulnerable to the 
criticisms of modern philosophers of science who rightly notice that 
twentieth century physics has undermined many particular features of his 
original a priori forms, or at least that it has considerably restricted their 
range of application to the immediate environment of mankind.  
The transcendental approach could then only survive and develop in the 
kind of version proposed by Neo-kantian philosophers such as Hermann 
Cohen or Ernst Cassirer, who both aknowledged to some extent the 
possibility of change of the a priori forms and their plurality as well. 
Nowadays, there is also another flexible and pluralist conception of the a 
priori; it is the pragmatist version of transcendental philosophy as defined 
by Putnam after Dewey. According to Putnam, each a priori form has to be 
considered as purely functional. It is relative to a certain mode of activity, 
it consists of the basic presuppositions of this mode of activity, and it has 
therefore to be changed as soon as the activity is abandoned or redefined. 
Putnam calls it a quasi-a priori when he wants to emphasize this 
flexibility11. This conception of the a priori may easily be combined with 
Hintikka's characterization of the transcendental attitude as a process of 
redirecting attention from the objects to our activities, and I shall thus 
retain it as part of a coherent neo-transcendentalist approach. 
 
3-Kant’s concepts of a “transcendental deduction” 
 
In the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents us with 
two varieties of the deduction. The first one develops as an argument from 
the possibility of experience, and it is called “objective”; the second one is 
based on the necessity of the unity of apperception (namely the fact that all 
representations have to be related to their common subject), and it is called 
“subjective”. The first one is weaker than the second one, but also less 
controversial. Indeed, the “objective” variety of the deduction only aims at 
deriving the background presuppositions of an experience which just 
happens to be organized as we know it, whereas the “subjective” variety 
somehow purports to demonstrate that this organization must obtain12. 
Here, I shall mainly discuss the “objective” variety, but later on I shall also 
make use of a thoroughly modified version of the “subjective” variety.  
                                         
10E. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit., A23-B38, p. 50 
11H. Putnam, Pragmatism,  Blackwell, 1995 
12W. Carl, “Kant's first draft of the transcendental deduction” in: E. Förster (ed.), Kant's transcendental 
deductions, Stanford University Press, 1989 
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According to Charles Taylor, a transcendental deduction is “(...) a 
regression from an unquestionable feature(...)” of our knowledge to “(...) a 
stronger thesis as the condition of its possibility”13. Now, what is the 
central unquestionable feature from Kant's standpoint? What is the 
characteristic mark of what he calls experience as against pure fleeting 
appearances? It is objectivity, since experience has been taken by Kant as 
equivalent to objective empirical knowledge14. Now, transcendental 
philosophy defines objectivity in two ways. These two ways are closely 
interrelated in Kant’s writings, but it is very important to emphasize the 
distinction in the context of a study of quantum mechanics. According to 
the first definition of objectivity, something is objective if it holds for any 
(human) subject. According to the second (more restrictive) definition, 
objectivity amounts to the possibility of organizing certain sets of 
appearances in such a way that their succession can be ascribed selectively 
to (a plurality of) objects. In order to find the pre-conditions of experience 
in Kant's most specific sense, one must therefore enquire into how it is 
possible to represent something as an object.  
The heart of this enquiry is concentrated in the section of the Critique of 
Pure Reason entitled The analytic of principles. There, Kant explains that 
in order to be construed as “objective”, a connection of perceptions has to 
be regarded as universal and necessary. For if it were not the case, if the 
connection were particular and contingent, nothing could prevent one from 
ascribing it, at least partly, to the idiosyncratic and temporary situation of 
the subject of perceptions. Prescription of a necessary temporal connection 
between appearances according to principles of pure understanding, is thus 
what makes it possible to consider our representations as objective, and 
more specifically as representations of (a plurality of) objects. It is what 
gives rise to knowledge properly speaking, provided knowledge is defined 
as the relation of given representations to well-defined objects. 
Particular deductions are then carried out by Kant for the three modes of 
connection in time, namely permanence, succession, and simultaneity; and 
they yield respectively the principle of the permanence of substance, the 
law of causality, and the law of reciprocity of action. These a priori laws 
of understanding, which are rules for the employment of categories, are not 
to be mixed up with the laws of physics. Empirical information is needed 
in order to know the particular laws of nature15. However “all empirical 
laws are only specific determinations of pure laws of the understanding”16, 
                                         
13Ch. Taylor, Philosophical arguments, Harvard University Press, 1995. Kant’s statement runs thus: 
“The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts has (...) a principle according to which the whole 
enquiry must be directed: to show that these concepts are a priori conditions of the possibility of all 
experience” ( E. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit., A93-B125, p. 96) 
14
 I. Kant, Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to present itself as science, 
Manchester university press, 1971, §21 
15E. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit., B165, p. 117 
16E. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit., A137, p. 127 
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since the pure laws of understanding are after all what make possible the 
very objects whose behaviour is supposed to be ruled by empirical laws. In 
his Metaphysical  foundations of natural science, Kant then gave a hint of 
how Newton's three laws of motion17 can be taken as specific 
determinations of the three mentioned laws of understanding when the 
latter are applied to the empirical concept of material body18. This 
procedure may be considered as a step towards a transcendental deduction 
of Newtonian mechanics. Admittedly, however, this deduction is doomed 
to remain partial, not only because a momentous empirical element (the 
concept of material body) has been used to derive the laws of motion, but 
also because, once the laws of motion have been obtained, one has to 
introduce further empirical material (i.e. the Kepler laws) in order to derive 
the inverse-square law of gravitation. 
 
4-A generalized transcendental deduction 
 
At this stage, our problem is the following: can one transpose Kant's 
partial transcendental deduction of Newtonian mechanics to quantum 
mechanics, by mere substitution of the empirical elements which serve  to 
determine the basic laws of understanding? Things are certainly not so 
simple. Kant's reasoning has to be altered much more than that in order to 
become applicable to quantum mechanics. But such an alteration has not to 
be deplored. For it yields two substantive advantages with respect to Kant's 
original undertaking. Firstly, it broadens considerably the scope of the 
transcendental method, thus making it liable to an increasing number of 
applications. Secondly, as we shall see later, it allows a transcendental 
deduction of quantum mechanics which is in many respects more extensive 
than Kant's deduction of Newtonian mechanics.  
Let us first recapitulate the two major steps of the original transcendental 
deduction. Its departure point is the fact that the flux of appearances is 
unified in such a way that it has the character of experience, or of 
representation of objects. And its end result is a set of laws of 
understanding considered as the conditions of possibility of experience. 
Both steps have to be thoroughly modified in order to meet the 
requirements of a transcendental deduction of quantum mechanics.  
To begin with, let us emphasize that organization of phenomena in such 
a way that they can be regarded as appearances of a plurality of interacting 
physical objects having properties (according to the second, restrictive, 
definition of objectivity), is by no means an indispensible ground of 
scientific activity. True, this organization is an ‘unquestioned feature’ of 
                                         
17Respectively the law of inertia, the proportionality of force and acceleration, and the equality of action 
and reaction. 
18M. Friedman, Kant and the exact sciences, Harvard University Press, 1992, chapter 3 
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our everyday life; and, as Kant noticed19, it is also a basic presupposition of 
judgments. But this feature, which nothing in the manipulations and 
observations we perform in our immediate environment has ever forced us 
to question, does not have any reason to remain unchallenged in every 
domain of experimentation. In some scientific situations, such as 
contemporary microphysics, the cost of maintaining an object-like 
organization of phenomena is out of proportion with its advantages. Instead 
of contenting ourselves with the unquestioned fact of the object-like 
organization presupposed in our acting and speaking, we should thus try to 
figure out what is the basic function it fulfils in our lives and in classical 
science20. Once this is done, the familiar object-like organization of the 
surrounding world is likely to appear as a restricted sub-class of the 
structures which are able to fulfil this function.  
What is then the minimum task the object-like organization carries out in 
our everyday lives? As I have already suggested in §2, this organization 
enables us to orientate our activities by anticipating the outcome of each 
act we perform, in such a way that the rules of anticipation can be 
communicated and collectively improved. That objects operate in our 
experience as anticipative frameworks has long been noticed by 
philosophers of the phenomenological tradition21. But they are by no means 
the most general anticipative frameworks one may conceive. Indeed, their 
anticipative function is embodied by predicates which (according to 
Carnap’s partial definition method, or S. Blackburn’s quasi-realist 
approach22) can be construed operationally as dispositions to manifest 
again and again a well-defined set of appearances when the same object is 
put under specified conditions. The anticipative function of the objects thus 
relies on the possibility of reidentifying a bearer of predicates across time; 
and the procedure of reidentification in turn requires a sufficient amount of 
continuity and determinism in the evolution of phenomena. When doubts 
are raised about the latter condition’s being fulfilled, a substitute for the 
objects qua anticipative structures is required. This substitute can be 
afforded by the concept of a reproducible global experimental situation. 
Now, replacing the concept of identity of an object by that of reproduction 
of experimental situations does three things. It releases, as required, the 
constraint on reidentification of bearers of predicates; it substitutes the 
most general acception of objectivity (universal validity of statements) for 
a restrictive acception (object-like organization of phenomena); and it 
enables one to use the broadest version of the concept of anticipation, 
namely that of probabilistic anticipation. Popper's concept of propensity, 
                                         
19E. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit., B141, p.104 
20
 In this respect, my analysis differs markedly from S. Auyang’s, who rather develops the concept of 
physical object from a renewed Kantian perspective, and who still takes the concept of particle seriously. 
see: How is quantum field theory possible?, op. cit. p. 99-100.  
21E. Husserl, Ideas (general introduction to pure phenomenology), G. Allen & Unwin, 1931 
22
 S. Blackburn, Essays in quasi-realism, Oxford University Press, 1993, chapter 14 
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which characterizes probabilistically types of experimental arrangements 
rather than individual objects, implements this kind of change. 
However, everything is not settled at this point. For, if the previous kind 
of operationalistic anticipative framework is to be efficient at all, it must be 
grounded on a reliable procedure for ascertaining that (experimental) 
situations are effectively reproduced. Of course, this procedure could itself 
amount to describing and performing a second-order experiment, whose 
anticipated outcome is the stable set-up of the first-order experiment. But 
the regress has to be stopped somewhere. It is at this point that the object-
organization of experience and discourse rises again. Indeed, predicating a 
property of an object is a way of implying the class of situations in which 
the appearances arising from the dispositional content of this property are 
observed. As Kant claimed repeatedly, referring to objects and properties is 
not tantamount to stepping back in ‘cosmic exile’ (that is in no worldly 
situation at all), thus talking about things as they are in themselves; it only 
means that one endorses tacitly the sort of situation which is common to 
every sentient and rational being inhabiting the environment of mankind. 
Describing an experimental set-up in terms of reidentifiable objects with 
properties is therefore a natural way of stopping the regress of explicitly 
stated situations and anticipations, by stating them implicitly.  
We now see that the object-like organization of the surrounding world is 
not only one among the many structures which afford communicable 
anticipations. It is also designed to be the last-order one. Bohr's insistance 
on everyday language and concepts to describe experiments, and 
Wittgenstein's remark in On certainty that “no such proposition as ‘there 
are physical objects’ can be formulated”23 are two ways of expressing this 
special limiting status of the object-like organization. 
Now we can state precisely what we take as the departure point of our 
transcendental deduction of quantum mechanics. As a first step of such a 
deduction we shall not choose a supposedly ‘unquestionable’ feature of 
knowledge (such as the object-like organization of phenomena), but rather 
a basic requirement bearing on the mode of anticipation of the results of 
our game of seeking and finding. The latter requirement can be stated by 
means of a language which only presupposes the object-like behaviour of 
the experimental devices, not of the field of investigation. Actually, if one 
took (as Kant did) an all-encompassing object-like organization as an 
unquestioned departure point, this would already be a way of requiring 
implicitly something specific about the mode of anticipation of the result of 
our game of seeking and finding. Therefore, the type of departure point 
which has just been suggested for the extended version of the 
transcendental deduction is a mere generalization of Kant’s. 
                                         
23L. Wittgenstein, On certainty, B. Blackwell, 1974, §36 
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The departure point of the new kind of transcendental deduction having 
been chosen, let us now wonder which kind of result we should expect 
from it. In Kant's reasoning, the end-product of the deduction was a set of 
laws of understanding, of which the laws of physics are specific 
determinations. The most crucial among the a priori laws of understanding 
are those which concern relations in time, especially the law of causality 
which concerns succession. But one must be careful at this stage. If one 
does not pay sufficient attention to Kant’s writings, some 
misunderstandings may arise. Some of his sentences sound as if, in order 
for experience to be made possible at all, one's understanding had to 
impose, say, the law of causality onto the succession of appearances. 
Actually, things are more subtle. The a priori laws of understanding which 
concern succession in time are called analogies of experience; they are not 
constitutive of the content of our intuition24, but rather regulative of 
investigations. They do not allow us to construct the existence of 
consecutive phenomena, for this would only be acceptable in the most 
extreme form of idealism; they only provide “(...) a rule to guide me in the 
search of (a phenomenon) in experience, and a mark to assist me in 
discovering it”25. The a priori laws of understanding thus do not have to be 
valid in the absolute within the field of appearances26. In order to make 
experience possible, in order to constitute experience, it is sufficient that 
we presuppose that appearances necessarily occur according to these laws, 
and that we always look for them according to such a presupposition. This 
qualification arises more or less explicitly from many sentences in Kant's 
deduction of the law of causality; for instance: “When we know in 
experience that something happens, we always presuppose that something 
precedes, whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule. For otherwise I 
could not say of the object, that it follows (...)”27. When carefully analyzed, 
Kant's laws of understanding then do not bear directly on some passively 
received material of knowledge, but rather on the strategies of action and 
anticipation that we must use in order to get something which deserves to 
be called objective knowledge. They are not descriptive laws but rather 
law-like prescriptions; and moreover they are prescribed not so much to 
the phenomena as to our research-behaviour. Let us retain this idea for our 
modern variety of the transcendental deduction: the end-product of a 
transcendental deduction is a strong structure of anticipation which is 
prescribed to our activity of seeking and finding.  
 
5-Transcendental constraints, quantum logic, and Hilbert space 
                                         
24
 They are not constitutive of the content of intuition, but they are constitutive of experience, in so far as 
they make its object-like structure possible (see below). 
25I. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit., A179-B222, p.167 
26See e.g. G. Buchdahl, Kant and the dynamics of reason (Essays on the structure of Kant's philosophy), 
B. Blackwell, 1992, p. 204 
27I. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit., A195-B240, p.176. See also A194, A198, A 200. 
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To recapitulate, a generalized transcendental deduction is a regression 
from a set of minimal requirements about the process of anticipation of 
phenomena, to a strong anticipative structure as the condition of possibility 
for these requirements to be satisfied. As we shall see, quantum mechanics 
construed as a predictive formalism can mostly be derived this way, 
provided a little number of very general constraints are imposed on the 
prediction of phenomena.  
What are these constraints?  
To begin with, the phenomena which have to be anticipated are 
contextual phenomena. This looks like a very drastic constraint indeed; one 
by which an essential ingredient of quantum mechanics is introduced in the 
reasoning from the outset, thus threatening our deduction with the charge 
of circularity. But I think this judgment is wrong. Saying that the 
phenomena to be anticipated are relative to an experimental context is 
tantamount to removing a familiar constraint, rather than introducing an 
additional one; it is tantamount to removing the constraint of de-
contextualization. Let me explain this by means of a historical example. As 
Descartes and Locke realized, large classes of phenomena can only be 
defined relative to a sensorial or instrumental context. They correspond to 
the so-called secondary qualities. Kant later generalized this remark in his 
Prolegomena.  According to him the spatial qualities, which were 
considered as primary or intrinsic by Locke, have also to be construed as 
appearances28, although Kant does not say that they are relative to a 
particular sensory structure but rather that they are relative to the general 
form of empirical intuition. It was thus widely accepted among 
philosophers, from the end of the seventeenth century onwards, that a 
phenomenon is usually relative to a certain context which defines the range 
of possible phenomena to which it belongs. However this epistemological 
remark, with all the consequences that its generalization could have had, 
did not change the way classical physicists conceived their objects. The 
reason for this indifference is that as long as the contexts can be combined, 
or as long as the phenomena can be made indifferent to the order and 
chronology of use of the contexts, nothing prevents one from merging the 
distinct ranges of possible phenomena relative to each context into a single 
range of possible conjunctions of phenomena. This being done, one may 
consider that the new range of possible compound phenomena is relative to 
a single ubiquitous context which is not even worth mentioning. Then, 
once one has forgotten the ubiquitous context, everything goes as if 
phenomena were reflecting intrinsic properties.  
Taking for granted the possibility of combining all the contexts, and/or 
the perspective of a perfect indifference of phenomena to the order of use 
                                         
28I. Kant, Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to present itself as science, op. cit. 
§13, note II, p. 46 
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of the contexts, thus means imposing a drastic constraint. It is equivalent to 
impose what we have called the constraint of de-contextualization. The 
structure of propositions in ordinary language, which allows us to ascribe 
several characteristics to a single object as if they were intrinsic properties 
(independent of any context), presupposes that this constraint is obeyed. 
Now, as it can easily be shown, this presupposition is closely associated to 
Boolean logic; for the logical operations between the propositions of a 
language underpinned by such a presupposition are isomophic to set-
theoretical operations. Moreover, the same presupposition is also closely 
associated to a Kolmogorovian theory of probabilities; indeed, 
Kolmogorov’s theory relies on classical set theory (or on a logic 
isomorphic to classical set theory) for the definition of the ‘events’ on 
which the probabilistic valuation is supposed to bear. 
Now what happens if the constraint of de-contextualisation is removed? 
In this situation, the rules of Boolean logic and of the Kolmogorovian 
theory of probabilities may still subsist, but in a fragmented form. To each 
experimental context, one may associate a given range of possible 
determinations and propositions which depend on a Boolean sub-logic. 
And to determinations chosen within each such range, one may associate 
real numbers in such a way that they obey the axioms of the 
Kolmogorovian theory of probabilities. But it is no longer possible to 
organize the whole set of experimental propositions, depending on several 
incompatible contexts, according to the structure of a single Boolean logic; 
nor is it possible to organize the whole set of probabilistic valuation as if 
they were bearing on a single Kolmogorovian domain of events.  
At this point, we must introduce the second constraint, (or rather the real 
constraint, since the first one was no constraint at all) in order to overcome 
the previous dismantling of the logic and probability field. This constraint 
is that to each experimental preparation, univocally described by means of 
a language which presupposes the familiar object-like organization, there 
must correspond a unified (non-Kolmogorovian) mathematical tool of 
probabilistic29 prediction, irrespective of the context associated to the 
measurement which follows the preparation. The sought unification of the 
predictive tool under the concept of a preparation may be expressed either 
by means of a single symbol allowing one to calculate the list of 
probabilities corresponding to any context (the “state vector”), or by using 
                                         
29
 One could wonder why this second constraint bears selectively on a tool of probabilistic prediction. 
Couldn’t it have concerned a tool of deterministic prediction? Isn’t this apparently arbitrary choice, and 
our former insistance on the theory of probability, a way of introducing implicitly one typical feature of 
quantum mechanics in a reasoning which is supposed to justify transcendentally its main features? 
Actually, this is not true. ‘Essential’ indeterminism of phenomena can be shown to derive from relaxation 
of the constraint of de-contextualisation and incompatibility of certain experimental contexts (See P. 
Destouches-Février, La structure des théories physiques, P.U.F., 1951, p. 277). Use of probabilities in the 
predictive theory, and irreducibility of the predictions to a deterministic scheme at the level of 
phenomena (though not necessarily at the level of hidden variables),  is thus a natural consequence of our 
first assumption. 
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transformation rules for the probabilistic valuations from one context to 
another (Dirac’s “transformation theory”).  
The previous constraint can be considered as a generalized equivalent of 
Kant's departure point for his so-called “subjective” transcendental 
deduction of the categories. The difference is that, whereas Kant demanded 
“(...) that all the manifold in intuition be subject to conditions of the 
originally synthetical unity of apperception”30, we demand that the 
manifold of probability assignments which bear on measurements 
following a given type of experimental preparation be subject to the unity 
of this type of preparation. The unifying pole is no longer a mentalistic 
entity (the apperception, or the “consciousness of oneself”31), but rather the 
objectified end-product of an experimental activity (the preparation). And 
the elements to be unified are no longer passively received contents of 
intuition, but rather formalized acts of anticipation.  
Taking into account the two former constraints, namely contextuality 
and unification of the predictive tool under the concept of a preparation, 
the basic structure of quantum mechanics is close at hand. Here, I shall 
only give a hint of how the reasoning proceeds, in two steps: the first one 
concerns quantum logic, and the second one concerns the relation between 
vectors in Hilbert space and probability valuations32.  
1) As Patrick Heelan33 noticed, meta-contextual languages able to unify 
contextual languages are isomorphic to Birkhoff's and Von Neumann's 
quantum logic. To show this, he used the following assumptions: 
 To begin with, let us consider two Boolean experimental context-
dependent languages LA and LB. Then, let us define a relation of 
implication (which operates at a meta-linguistic level “ML”), in such a way 
that one language implies another language iff every sentence of the first 
one is also a sentence of the second one. After that, we consider two other 
languages: LO which is such that it implies any language, and LAB which is 
such that it is implied by the all the other languages, including the set-
theoretical complements L’A and L’B of LA and LB in LAB.The crucial 
assumption is that LAB is richer than a language made of all the 
propositions of LA , LB and their logical conjunctions or disjunctions. This 
assumption expresses context-dependence; indeed, in the case of context-
dependence, a combination of contexts yields experimental consequences 
which are distinct from mere combinations of what occurs when each 
context is used separately. Finally, we define two functors ⊗ and ⊕  in the 
meta-contextual language ML, which are the equivalents of “and” and “or” 
                                         
30I. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit., B135, p. 101 
31I. Kant, Critique of pure reason,  op. cit., B68, p. 66 
32For more details, see M. Bitbol, Mécanique quantique, une introduction philosophique, Flammarion, 
1996 
33
 P. Heelan, “Complementarity, context-dependance, and quantum logic”, Found. Phys. 1, 95-110, 
1970; P. Heela, ”Quantum and classical logic: their classical role”, Synthese, 21, 2-33, 1970; also: S. 
Watanabe, “The algebra of observation”, Suppl. Prog. Theor. Phys., 37 and 38, 350-367, 1966. 
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in a first-level language: ⊗ stands for “least upper bound” and ⊕ for 
“greatest lower bound” (of the relation of implication). With these 
definitions and assumptions, it is easy to show that the structure of the 
meta-contextual language ML can but be an orthocomplemented non-
distributive lattice. Then, if this structure is projected onto the first-level 
language, it takes the form of the familiar “quantum logic”. To summarize, 
the specific structure of “quantum logic” is unavoidable when unification 
of contextual languages at a meta-linguistic level is demanded. In this 
sense, one can say that quantum logic has been derived by means of a 
transcendental argument: it is a condition of possibility of a meta-language 
able to unify context-dependent experimental languages. 
2) As J.L. Destouches and P. Destouches-Février34 argued convincingly, 
the formalism of vectors in a Hilbert space, together with Born's 
correspondence rule, is the simplest predictive formalism among those 
which obey the constraint of unicity in a situation where de-
contextualization cannot be carried out. To show this, J.L. Destouches 
starts from a list of context-dependent probability valuations for the results 
of measurements performed after a preliminary measurement (or, more 
generally, after a given preparation). The problem is that each probability 
valuation does not hold beyond a certain couple [preparationV , 
measurementW]. In order to overcome this lack of unity, one is led to define 
a set Ξ in such a way that (a) an element XV of this set is associated to each 
preparation with index V, and (b) the probability valuation PVW for a couple 
[preparationV
 
, measurementW] is a function (indexed by W) of XV. XV is 
called an “element of prediction” associated to the V-th preparation. Then, 
J.L. Destouches demonstrates that, provided one adds enough elements to 
Ξ for transforming it into a vector space Ξ∗, the procedure for calculating a 
probability valuation PVW  from an element of prediction XV can be 
simplified as follows. Firstly, one defines special elements of prediction 
XVW(i)  such that the probability of obtaining the result Wi if measurement W 
is performed after preparation V, is equal to 1. Secondly, one replaces  XV  
by (or, in the simplest, Hilbert-space like, case, one identifies XV to) the 
linear superposition ΣciXVW(i) , where ci can be either real or complex. One 
can then show that the sought probability valuation PVW is given by: 
PVW(Wi)=f(ci).  
The next problem is to determine the function f. At this point, P. 
Destouches-Février35 demonstrates that, when the probability valuations 
                                         
34
 J.L. Destouches, Corpuscules et systèmes de corpuscules, Gauthier-Villars, 1941; P. Destouches-
Février, La structure des théories physiques, P.U.F., 1951; P. Destouches, L’interprétation physique de la 
mécanique ondulatoire et des théories quantiques, Gauthier-Villars, 1956 
35
 P. Destouches-Février, La structure des théories physiques, P.U.F., 1951, p. 240. For related theorems 
see H. Everett, “‘Relative state’ formulation of quantum mechanics”, Reviews of modern physics, 29, 
454-462, 1957 (last section), and also A.M. Gleason, “Measures on the closed subspaces of a Hilbert 
space”, Journal of mathematics and mechanics, 6, 885-893, 1957. A survey can be found in: R.I.G. 
Hughes, The structure and interpretation of quantum mechanics, Harvard University Press, 1989. 
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bear on magnitudes which may be “incompatible” (namely magnitudes 
which may be such that they cannot be measured simultaneously with an 
arbitrary precision), the function f is unique, and takes the form f(ci)= |ci|2. 
The demonstration relies on a generalized variety of the Pythagoras 
theorem in space Ξ∗. 
To summarize, the formalism of vectors in a Hilbert space associated 
with Born’s rule affords the simplest unified meta-contextual probability 
valuation algorithm, if the contexts are sometimes incompatible (in the 
above sense), and if each contextual probability sub-structure is 
Kolmogorovian. It is a minimal structural condition of possibility of a 
unified system of probabilistic predictions, whenever the constraint of de-
contextualization has been released. 
 
6-Transcendental arguments about connection in time 
 
Of course, everything is not settled at this point. The formalism of 
vectors in a Hilbert space, construed as a meta-contextual probability 
theory, is not enough to constitute quantum mechanics. Many elements 
have to be added to it. To begin with, we need a law of evolution of the 
probabilistic predictive symbols, namely the vectors themselves. Now, it is 
well known36 that under several assumptions ensuring: (i) that the numbers 
computed by means of the Born's rule obey the Kolmogorov's axioms at all 
times (i.e. that the evolution operators are unitary), and (ii) that the set of 
evolution operators has the structure of a one-parameter group of linear 
operators (where the parameter is time), one obtains the general form of 
both Schrödinger's and Dirac's equation, leaving open the structure of the 
Hamiltonian. The Hamiltonian can eventually be obtained either by means 
of the correspondence principle with classical physics, or by introducing 
directly the fundamental symmetries which underly classical mechanics 
and/or relativistic mechanics.  
It is not very difficult to convince ourselves that at each step of this 
mode of derivation of the law of evolution of the predictive symbol, 
transcendental arguments play the key role. Some of them are 
transcendental arguments per se, e.g. the requirement of trans-temporal 
stability of the probabilistic status of the predictive tool (without it, one 
would just have to give up the attempt at providing enduring probabilistic 
valuations for experimental events). The other ones are bridging 
transcendental arguments. They establish a bridge between the form of 
transcendental deduction which was used by Kant within the direct spatio-
temporal environment of mankind, and the generalized sort of 
transcendental deduction needed in domains of scientific investigation 
                                         
36
 R.I.G. Hughes, The structure and interpretation of quantum mechanics, op. cit.; B. Van Fraassen, 
Quantum mechanics, an empiricist view, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 177-181; T.F. Jordan, Linear 
operators for quantum mechanics, J. Wiley, 1969 
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which may go beyond the human Umwelt. This is especially clear for the 
correspondence principle, because it ensures a proper connection between 
(a) the basic (last-order) object-like organization which is common to 
everyday life and classical mechanics, and (b) the contextual organization 
of quantum mechanics. This is also clear for certain symmetry 
requirements such as time, space, and rotation invariance, which, as Eugen 
Wigner wrote, “(...) are almost necessary prerequisite that it be possible to 
discover (...) correlations between events”37. Finally (even though this is 
less obvious), the statement according to which the set of evolution 
operators must be a one-parameter group of linear unitary operators can 
also be read as a bridging transcendental argument. Indeed, this condition 
is tantamount to splitting up the transcendental demand of unity of the 
predictive tool under the concept of a preparation, according to the three 
kantian modes of connection in time (namely permanence, succession, and 
simultaneity). To see this, one has to realize that imposing the structure of 
a time-parameter group of linear unitary operators to the set of evolution 
operators has the three following consequences: 
(1) It amounts to projecting the continuity of the parameter ‘time’ onto 
the domain of the probabilistic predictive tool (namely the state vector).  
(2) It entails that the evolution of this predictive tool is deterministic38. 
(3) By the linearity of the evolution operators, the structure of the linear 
superpositions of state vectors is maintained across time.  
Let us analyze these three consequences more precisely:  
(1’) Continuity makes possible to identify a certain state vector as the 
time-transform of the state vector which was initially associated with a 
given preparation; it fulfills the function of the category of substance, 
applying it to the predictive tool rather than directly to phenomena.  
(2’) Determinism ensures that a state vector at a certain time follows 
state vectors at previous times according to a univocal rule; it fulfills the 
function of the category of causality, again applying it to the predictive 
tool rather than directly to phenomena39.  
(3’) As for the constant structure of the linear superpositions of state 
vectors across time, it means that there is an enduring internal relation 
between the predictive contents of two or more preparations when they 
have been combined into one single compound preparations40; it fulfills the 
                                         
37E. Wigner, Symmetries and reflections, Ox Bow Press, 1979, p. 29 
38
 B. Van Fraassen, Quantum mechanics, an empiricist view, op. cit. p. 178 
39
 The idea that in quantum mechanics the point of application of the category of causality has somehow 
been shifted from the evolution of phenomena to the evolution of state vectors has been developed in a 
kantian context by: P. Mittelstaedt, Philosophical problems of modern physics, Reidel, 1976. The 
premises of this idea can already be found in M. Born’s papers of 1926. 
40
 This short statement according to which a linear superposition of state vectors corresponds to a 
combination of preparations, refers to a pragmatic reading of the so-called ‘principle of superposition’. 
According to Dirac, the principle of superposition is a new law of nature (P.A.M. Dirac, The principles of 
quantum mechanics, Oxford University Press, 1947, §2). In the pragmatic-transcendental approach, the 
principle of superposition boils down to a normative statement of co-extensivity of the Hilbert space 
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function of the category of reciprocity, by applying it to the predictive 
content of coexisting preparations, rather than directly to coexisting 
phenomena. 
To summarize, imposing that the set of evolution operators have the 
structure of a time-parameter group of linear unitary operators is 
tantamount to shifting the locus of the categories of understanding, and 
especially the analogies of experience, from the phenomena to the 
predictive frame. This move is in good agreement with Schrödinger’s 
(quasi-) realist construal of ψ-functions, and with G. Cohen-Tannoudji’s 
remark that Hilbert space, not ordinary space, is the proper place of 
quantum objectivity41. A similar idea was also advocated by P. 
Mittelstaedt42. 
At this point, it is interesting to draw some philosophical consequences 
from the fact that the formalism of quantum mechanics, together with some 
appropriate boundary conditions, enables one to derive both quantization 
conditions and prediction of wave-like distributions of phenomena. In the 
light of the way in which the formalism has been justified, these two 
effects acquire a meaning which is thoroughly different from what is 
usually implied in the loosely realist mode of expression of the quantum 
physicists. Here, wave-like distributions and quantization no longer appear 
as contingent aspects of nature. They are a necessary feature of any activity 
of production of contextual and mutually incompatible phenomena whose 
level of reproducibility is sufficient for its outcomes to be embeddable in a 
unified and time-connected meta-contextual system of probabilistic 
anticipation. 
Of course, not everything in the quantum predictions can be 
transcendentally deduced. Just as in Kant's transcendental deduction of 
Newtonian mechanics, an empirical element has to be introduced 
somewhere. However,  there are interesting differences between the 
empirical elements which had to be added to get Newtonian mechanics and 
the empirical elements which we must introduce to get standard quantum 
mechanics. In order to complete his deduction of Newtonian mechanics 
and to obtain the law of gravitation, Kant had to add both an empirical 
concept (that of material body) and a set of empirical laws (Kepler's 
laws)43. But in order to complete the transcendental deduction of quantum 
                                                                                                                       
formalism and the domain of experimental preparations to which it applies. It says that given two state 
vectors, each corresponding to a well-defined preparation, there exists a third preparation such that its 
predictive content is appropriately expressed by a linear superposition of the two previous state vectors. If 
this was never true, it would mean that the formalism is too general for the phenomena to be predicted. 
More specifically, it would be tantamount to imposing a generalized superselection principle, thus 
cancelling the consequences of contextuality. Then, if the constraint of de-contextualization is to be 
relaxed effectively, some principle of superposition must hold. 
41
 G. Cohen-Tannoudji & M. Spiro, La matière espace-temps, Gallimard, 1990, p. 162 
42
 P. Mittelstaedt, Philosophical problems of modern physics, op. cit. 
43
 This is the method he used in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, published in 1786; but 
three years earlier, in his Prolegomena to any future metaphysics, he claimed to be able to provide a 
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mechanics construed as a predictive formalism bearing on global 
experimental situations, we do not need the concept of an object of the 
investigation44. Even less do we have to introduce any empirical law-like 
structure; for the basic law-like structure of standard quantum mechanics 
(i.e. Schrödinger's equation) has already be obtained. We only need one 
very simple, and non-structural, empirical ingredient, namely the value of 
the Planck constant. And we also need some additional (“internal”) 
symmetry principles whose empirical or transcendental status is at present 
unclear. 
True, these are crucial ingredients. Let me insist on the value of the 
Planck constant. This constant sets quantitatively, through Heisenberg's 
relations, the possibility of  partially compensating for the mutual 
incompatibility of experimental contexts. If it were just equal to zero, 
measurements of conjugate variables would be indifferent to the order of 
measurements, and a basic condition of de-contextualisation would then be 
fulfilled. Conversely, the non-zero value of the Planck constant means that 
the de-contextualisation of experimental outcomes can only be performed 
up to a certain precision. Hence the need to regard Kant's original 
transcendental deduction, which started from de-contextualized premises, 
as a particular case, and to generalize it to a situation where contextuality 
becomes unavoidable. 
Now, we must not limit our investigation to the framework set by the 
Kant’s Critique of pure reason. The Critique of Judgment introduced a new 
kind of transcendental argument which is admittedly weaker than the 
familiar one. This new variety of transcendental argument is not 
‘determinative’ but ‘reflective’, and it is explicitly non-objective. Indeed, 
according to Kant, it is grounded on our subjective need to think nature as a 
systematic unity, and to presuppose a teleological order for that. Can’t the 
value of Planck’s constant be obtained this way, thus complementing the 
set of transcendental arguments which lead to quantum mechanics? The 
answer is positive, provided one uses the modern version of the 
teleological argument for the determination of the universal constants, 
namely the weak anthropic principle.  
In fine, there is but one element which is bound to remain beyond the 
reach of any variety of transcendental argument, be it grounded on 
subjective requirements: it is the occurrence of a particular outcome, after 
each single run of an experiment. This is not very surprising. As R. 
                                                                                                                       
(weak) transcendental justification of the inverse-square law of gravitation. This justification relies on the 
geometrical circumstance that concentric spherical surfaces stand to one another as the squares of their 
radii. See M. Friedman, Kant and the exact sciences, op. cit. chapter 4 
44We only need that the functions it fulfils in classical mechanics be partially fulfilled in the new 
situation. These functions are: an order of multiplicity (which can be accounted for in terms of eigenvalue 
N of the observable number, rather than in terms of N particles), a criterion of reidentification (which can 
persist only in fragmented form), and a class (it is not even appropriate to say ‘of entities’) which is able 
to represent certain determinations which could be treated as properties (i.e. the superselective 
observables). 
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Omnès45 rightly pointed out, the actuality of each particular phenomenon 
cannot be accounted for by any physical theory. The only thing a physical 
theory does, and the only thing it has to do, is to embed documented 
actualities in a (deterministic or statistical) framework, and to use this 
framework to anticipate, to a certain extent, what will occur under well-
defined experimental circumstances. What we have shown in this paper is 
that, at least in the case of standard quantum mechanics, such a framework 
can be justified as a structural condition for a minimal set of constraints on 




To conclude, I shall briefly discuss the benefits we can draw from the 
kind of transcendental deduction I have just outlined, and also its limits. I 
think the specificity of a transcendental argument is that it starts from our 
engaged situation in the world, then deriving the basic pre-conditions of 
our orientation within this situation. In this respect, it is quite at variance 
with any variety of ontological attitude, be it the positivistic ontology of 
facts or the realist ontology of objects. Indeed, ontological attitudes 
systematically favour a disengaged outlook, even though their very 
undertaking is grounded on the presuppositions of an engaged activity. As 
Charles Taylor emphasizes, “With hindsight, we can see (Kant's 
transcendental deduction) as the first attempt to articulate the background 
that the modern disengaged picture itself requires for the operation it 
describes to be intelligible, and to use this articulation to undermine the 
picture”46. But how does the transcendental approach manage to undermine 
the pictures so cherished by the supporters of the ontological (disengaged) 
outlook? It does so by showing that the predictive success of some of our 
most general scientific theories can be ascribed, to a large extent, to the 
circumstance that they formalize the minimal requirements of any 
prediction of the outcomes of our activity, be it gestural or experimental. 
The very structure of these theories is seen to embody the performative 
structure of the experimental undertaking. As a consequence, there is no 
need to further explain their efficiency by their ability to reflect in their 
structure the backbone of nature. The inference to the best explanation, 
which is the most powerful argument of scientific realists, looks much 
weaker, because the choice is no longer between the realist explanation of 
the efficiency of theories and no explanation at all. A third alternative has 
been proposed: it consists in regarding the structure of the most advanced 
theories as embodiments of the necessary pre-conditions of a wide class of 
activities of seeking and predicting.  
                                         
45
 R. Omnès, The interpretation of quantum mechanics, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 350 
46
 Ch. Taylor, Philosophical arguments, op. cit. p. 72 
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In the latter perspective, the project of ontologizing certain theoretical 
entities appears as a mere attempt at hypostasizing the major invariants of 
these activities. True, ontologizing theoretical entities enables the 
philosopher to make sense of the intentional attitude and the seriousness 
with which the physicist aims at his hypothetical objects. However, by 
doing so too dogmatically, one takes the risk of freezing the ontological 
structure. Intentional attitudes call for objects, but it would be very 
imprudent to assert that, conversely, self-existent objects are what justify 
the intentional attitudes. As for seriousness, it calls for a sense of the 
absolute, but it would be very imprudent to assert that, conversely, the 
existence of an absolute self-structured reality ‘out there’ is what justifies 
seriousness in our striving for structures.  
By contrast, the transcendental approach is able to afford both a non-
metaphysical explanation of the structure and efficiency of theories, and a 
satisfactory account of the intentional directedness of scientific research in 
each paradigmatic situation, provided one associates it with some variety 
of internal realism in Putnam's sense. 
Now let me give a hint of the (alleged or true) shortcomings of the 
transcendental approach. I can see three of them.  
(1) The transcendental account comes too late. It can make sense of 
physical theories only ex post facto and it is thus no instrument of 
discovery. My answer to this criticism is twofold.  
On the one hand, I accept the criticism to a certain extent, although I 
think that this is the fate of every sound philosophical argument. As 
Wittgenstein would have it, philosophers only have to describe (the 
scientific activity) and leave it as it is. One must aknowledge that, during 
the preparatory phase of a scientific revolution, the realist discourse and 
representations prevail. One must also aknowledge that it is by criticizing 
some of these representations and testing other representations instead, that 
scientists are able to cross the boundary between the old paradigm and the 
new one. They do not use directly, during the initial stage of their process 
of discovery, the pragmatic transcendental method which consists in taking 
the basic requirements of a certain experimental activity as a departure 
point and obtaining a theoretical structure as a condition of their 
possibility. This is so because in order to carry out such a procedure one 
would have to define the type of activity whose norms are to be formalized, 
before the corresponding theory has been formulated. But the exact nature 
of the shift in the type of experimental activity is usually clear only after 
the theory has been stated. As long as the theory has not been fully 
formulated, physicists usually act as if they were only probing farther and 
farther into a traditional domain of objects (which can be thought of as one 
possible projection of the norms of the old mode of experimental activity). 
It is the gap between the findings of the scientists and their expectations 
about these putative objects which motivates a move towards radical 
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changes. And it is by an analysis of the new paradigm that the philosopher 
is able to disclose retrospectively the shift in the type of experimental 
activity which made the changes unavoidable. 
On the other hand, it is not true that philosophy in general, and 
transcendental philosophy in particular, have had no role whatsoever in the 
major advances of science. Careful philosophical reflection may contribute, 
and has contributed in the past, to modifying the language-game of 
scientific research, thus favouring the evolution of heuristic 
representations. Transcendental approaches are especially efficient in 
weakening the ontological rigidities which hinder the major changes 
needed when the presuppositions of experimental activities have been so 
widened that their outcomes exceed by far the domain of validity of the 
accepted theoretical framework. As I mentioned earlier, this ability did not 
give the transcendental approaches any importance during the preliminary 
phase of scientific revolutions. But it enabled a special variety of 
transcendental procedures, namely the use of principles of relativity, to 
play a key role during the central phase of the major scientific revolutions 
of the 17th and 20th century. Indeed principles of relativity operate as a 
way of emancipating law-like structures from particular situations, thus 
stating improved conditions of objective knowledge without recourse to 
ontologization (and even bypassing older ontological systems). Galileo’s 
principle of relativity bypassed Aristotle’s ontology of natural place. As for 
Einstein’s principle of special relativity, it bypassed Lorentz’ ontological-
like electrodynamic explanation of contraction of moving bodies and 
slowing down of moving clocks. The only circumstance which prevented 
one from seeing clearly the transcendental nature of these principles of 
relativity is that their formulation was usually followed by a phase of 
renewal of ontological-like discourses: discourse about kinematic and 
dynamic properties of bodies in the case of classical mechanics, and 
discourse about the properties of four-dimensional space-time in the case 
of relativistic mechanics. But in quantum mechanics, recovery of an 
ontological-like mode of expression raises an impressive number of 
problems, and this may make transcendental approaches more permanently 
attractive in this case than in most other cases. 
(2) The pragmatic or functional version of the transcendental approach 
apparently leads one to relativism. It looks as if it were possible to justify 
any (right or wrong) physical theory this way. The recipe is simple: take a 
mathematically coherent theory, display its normative structure, and invent 
an activity which goes with it.  
Actually, things are not so straightforward. The reason is that not every 
type of activity counts as an acceptable experimental activity. When 
defining an experimental activity, one has to take certain constraints into 
account, the most fundamental of them being that the activity must be so 
selected that it fits with the prescription of a sufficient degree of 
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reproducibility and universality. Other constraints, expressed by 
irreducibly empirical universal constants, lead one to adopt certain classes 
of activities and their associated physical theories. For instance, the 
finiteness of the constant c is naturally associated with the (typically 
relativistic) practice of comparing ruler and clock readings from one 
inertial frame to another. As for the non-zero value of the constant h, it had 
the consequence that traditional practices, which presuppose the possibility 
of manipulating and studying reidentifiable bearers of properties, were  
explicitly or implicitly superseded by activities of production of (partially 
incompatible) contextual phenomena.  
But isn’t acceptance of such constraints tantamount to aknowledging 
that there exists a pre-given independent reality ‘out there’ which imposes 
its structures on us, and which we ultimately have, as much as we can, to 
represent faithfully47? This consequence does not follow. Saying that an 
experimental activity is submitted to constraints does not amount to saying 
that certain structural patterns are imposed by something external. When he 
tried to make sense of the rules of arithmetics, Wittgenstein provided many 
important insights which clarify this point. To summarize, he indicated that 
even though the rules of arithmetic cannot be considered as true to a set of 
independent facts, they fit elegantly with certain constraints which appear 
from within the practice of applying them48. In other words, the ‘facts’ 
which constrain these rules do not preexist to their being used. In the same 
way, even though the present physical theories cannot be considered as 
describing a set of intrinsically existent properties, they fit elegantly with 
certain constraints which appear from within the accepted experimental 
practices. It is especially manifest in the quantum case that the ‘facts’ 
which constrain the norms of its associated experimental practice do not 
preexist to the enactment of this practice, for they are contextual, and their 
contextuality cannot in general be compensated due to the non-zero value 
of the Planck constant. As for the value of the Planck constant itself, which 
sets quantitatively the degree of incompatibility of contexts, it can be 
considered, from the point of view of the weak anthropic principle, as 
arising from within the generic situation of mankind (which defines the 
range of possible human practices), rather than as a completely extrinsic 
datum. This being granted, a theory like quantum mechanics no longer 
appears as a reflection of some (exhaustive or non-exhaustive aspect) of a 
pre-given nature, but as the structural expression of the co-emergence of a 
new type of experimental activity and of the ‘factual’ elements which 
constrain it49. 
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 For a thorough discussion on this point, see: B. d’Espagnat, Veiled reality, op. cit.; and M. Bitbol & S. 
Laugier (eds.), Physique et réalité, un débat avec Bernard d’Espagnat, Editions Frontières, 1997 
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 See J. Bouveresse, La force de la règle, Editions de Minuit, 1987; S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on rules and 
private language, Blackwell, 1982 
49
 See F. Varela, E. Thompson, & E. Rosch, The embodied mind, op. cit., for similar remarks in the 
general framework of the cognitive sciences. 
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 (3) Charles Taylor writes that “There are certain ontological questions 
which lie beyond the scope of transcendental arguments”50.  Actually, we 
could even assert that transcendental arguments are designed to avoid 
having to answer ontological questions in the metaphysical sense. But is 
not this refusal quite unsatisfactory? One might accept the conclusion of 
the transcendental deduction in its stronger version, namely that the 
structure of a theory reflects exclusively the necessary pre-conditions of 
experimental research, and still feel uneasy. For, even if the theory cannot 
claim to have captured any structural feature of reality, but only the basic 
underlying structures of a wide class of research activities,  it remains that 
we partake, with our bodies and our experimental apparatuses, of 
something broader that we can but call ‘reality’. Furthermore, the former 
notion of co-emergence of an experimental activity and its constraining 
‘factual’ elements, which is so closely akin to the transcendental method, 
raises the temptation to adumbrate a picture of ‘reality’ as an organic whole 
made of highly interdependent processes. Could not one hope to get an 
insight into this real reality? I think that such a project is not only doomed 
to failure due to some contingent boundary between us and the “thing-in-
itself”; it is hopeless because it is self-defeating. It is tantamount to 
assuming that it makes sense to seek what is reality independently of any 
activity of seeking; or to characterize reality relative to no procedure of 
characterization at all51. Now, let us imagine that this paradoxical search 
can nevertheless be undertaken. The result one naturally expects in this 
case is that ‘reality is A’ as opposed to ‘reality is not-A’, for, if this were 
not the case, the whole process would have led to nothing worth 
mentioning. But is not the very statement that reality in the absolute is 
either A or not-A extremely daring? I should not venture to think that it is 
even likely.  
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 See M. Mugur-Schächter, “Mécanique quantique, réalité et sens” and C. Schmitz, “Objectivité et 
temporalité”, and the answers by B. d’Espagnat, in: M. Bitbol & S. Laugier (eds.) Physique et Réalité, un 
débat avec Bernard d'Espagnat, Editions Frontières-Diderot, 1997. There, as in his Veiled Reality op. 
cit., B. d’Espagnat aknowledges that, in general, any description is relative to a given descriptive context. 
But he also presents a very subtle defence of the idea that certain broad structural features such as non-
separability, which are common to any onlogically interpretable theory able to reproduce quantum 
predictions, can be considered as a reflection of the structure of an “independent reality”. 
